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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL REVIEW UNDER NEPA: A CASE STUDY 
OF SCRAP u. US. 
By T. Mary McDonald* 
Judicial interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 (NEPA)I has established vastly different standards of review 
for the requirements, procedural and substantive, which NEPA 
imposes on federal agencies. Because of these differing standards of 
review, courts have exercised more latitude in reviewing procedural 
compliance with NEPA, and have often found agency compliance 
lacking. Because some fault may almost always be found with 
agency procedural compliance, and because procedural violations 
provide a solid and objective basis upon which to grant injunctive 
relief against agency action, courts are inclined to decide NEP A 
cases on procedural grounds even when substantive grounds for the 
decision are available. This judicial tendency has been accentuated 
by an apparent interface between NEPA's substantive and proce-
dural requirements. The interface first became evident in the defini-
tive judicial gloss2 given to NEPA in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission,3 where 
the court held that NEPA requires a "full good faith consideration" 
and balancing of environmental factors in federal agency decision-
making.4 The opinion of the three judge court in Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States,5 upon 
remand from the Supreme Court,8 is illustrative of the judicial 
treatment likely to be afforded in this gray area of NEPA rights. 
This article will attempt first to delineate more clearly the interrela-
tionships of substantive and procedural rights under NEPA, and 
subsequently, to probe the judicial psyche in applying NEPA to 
environmentally objectionable federal conduct through an analysis 
of the SCRAP opinion. 
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I. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR PROCEDURAL RIGHTS UNDER 
NEPA 
NEPA requires all federal administrative agencies to consider the 
environmental impacts of proposed projects in their decision-
making processes. Section 101 expresses the environmental policy 
adopted by Congress.7 Section 102 specifies the action-forcing proce-
dures designed to effectuate that policy.s To date, the vast majority 
of courts interpreting NEPA have focused on Section 102(2)(C)'s 
requirement that an environmental impact statement (EIS) be pre-
pared in connection with all "major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment."9 Resort to litiga-
tion has been constantly necessary to clarify the dimensions and 
app1icability of this phrase. As other more subtle aspects of the 
impact statement requirement have emerged, they have also re-
ceived thorough judicial treatment. This extensive judicial enforce-
ment of NEP A was by no means a foregone conclusion when the 
statute was enacted, since NEP A does not expressly provide for 
judicial review of agency compliance with its provisions. Courts 
have recognized a presumption of reviewability of agency action, 10 
however, and have stepped forward to become NEPA's primary 
enforcement mechanism." 
To meet the duties imposed under Section 102(2)(C), federal 
agencies must first decide, in connection with each action they take, 
whether an EIS is required at all. The answer to this threshold 
question hinges on the application of the phrase "major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment. "12 If the agency decides that NEPA demands filing of an EIS 
for a given project, the question of when the EIS should be prepared 
must be determined next. For example, will an EIS have to be 
prepared before any major planning begins, or will the agency be 
able to postpone EIS preparation until implementation is at hand? 
Once the timing issue is resolved, the agency must determine the 
proper content of the EIS. Must an EIS re-evaluate the basic merits 
of the overall agency program, or will it suffice for the statement 
merely to discuss the localized impact of implementation of a spe-
cific segment of the overall program? Finally, the agency must give 
good faith objective consideration to the EIS at every stage of the 
decision-making process. It is submitted that this final "proce-
dural" requirement merges into a gray area between substantive 
review and procedural review. 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court's landmark decision in 
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Calvert Cliffs13 established the framework within which NEPA's 
procedural duties have been judicially enforced. Because NEPA 
expressly calls for implementation of its procedural provisions "to 
the fullest extent possible,"14 the court viewed NEPA as setting "a 
high standard for the agencies, a standard which must be rigorously 
enforced by the reviewing courtS."15 The court's probing review of 
agency procedural compliance with Section 102(2)(C) was premised 
on procedural requirements which "are not highly flexible" but 
rather "establish a strict standard of compliance."16 The demand for 
strict procedural compliance which characterized the Calvert Cliffs 
opinion, has set the tenor for subsequent judicial review under 
NEPA's impact statement requirement. 
In line with the active judicial role outlined in Calvert Cliffs, 
courts have carefully scrutinized agency compliance with NEPA. 
Courts have generally treated the initial question of whether an EIS 
must be prepared in connection with a particular federal action as 
presenting a question of law rather than fact. Thus, they have con-
ducted virtually de novo review of the relevant facts to decide this 
issue. 17 Most courts keep the threshold low when determining which 
projects require impact statements. 18 If there is any doubt in a par-
ticular situation whether an EIS is necessary, the long-range effects 
of single projects or the cumulative impact of a number of smaller 
related projects will be taken into account. Considering such cumu-
lative or long-range effects facilitates a finding that NEPA applies 
and that an EIS must be prepared. 19 According to one commentator: 
"'major' now means almost any action anyone cares enough to chal-
lenge in the courts, and 'significantly' means discernibly, not insig-
nificantly, or perhaps 'at all.' "20 
To facilitate judicial review of this threshold issue, courts have 
often required agencies to prepare a documentation supporting their 
decision that an EIS is not required for the project at issue (the so-
called negative EIS). In making this negative determination, agen-
cies are required to review the same factors that would be studied 
in an EIS, although treatment need not be as detailed. 21 Addition-
ally, the public must be given notice that this threshold determina-
tion is being made and a chance to submit data on the proposed 
project. When appropriate, a public hearing may even be necessary 
at this stage.22 
Several courts which require such procedures to be followed if an 
agency decides not to file an EIS do not conduct a de novo review 
of the agency's threshold determination, but only reverse an agency 
decision which is found to be arbitrary or capricious.23 Even though 
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an agency may escape reversal under this less strict standard, the 
required record for review ensures that environmental factors will be 
taken into account by agencies in every case. It may therefore be 
just as easy to produce an EIS in a given instance as to provide the 
judicially required detailed record for review.24 
Once the threshold issue has been answered affirmatively, an 
agency must determine when, in relation to the overall project plan-
ning and implementation process, the EIS must be prepared. The 
need for preparation of impact statements early in the decision-
making process was forcefully explained in Calvert Cliffs and has 
become an accepted principle of NEPA construction.25 Neverthe-
less, courts have differed in their implementation of this principle 
in individual cases. Like the initial question of whether to draft an 
EIS at all, the timing question is of crucial importance. If EIS 
preparation is delayed too long, undesirable environmental conse-
quences may become unavoidable for all practical purposes. For this 
reason, de novo judicial review of an agency's decision as to timing 
of a project's EIS has also been endorsed. 
In Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. (SIPI) v. 
United States Atomic Energy Commission the court recognized the 
problems inherent in the timing issue. 26 In technology development 
programs, for example, impact statements must be drafted after the 
technical processes have been sufficiently developed to make the 
information provided therein meaningful. At the same time, such 
impact statements must be drafted soon enough to provide mean-
ingful input into the decision-making process. Preparation should 
therefore occur before excessive resources have been poured into the 
developmental program and potentially less damaging alternatives 
have been foreclosed. Since this determination requires significant 
expertise, the SIPI court placed upon the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC) "the initial and primary responsibility for striking a 
balance between the competing concerns."27 While granting some 
leeway to the AEC on EIS timing, the SIPI court nevertheless recog-
nized the need for judicial scrutiny of the agency's timing decision. 
It emphasized that courts should "require the agenc[ies] to provide 
a framework for principled decision making," including procedures 
for regular agency evaluation of whether the proper time for drafting 
an impact statement has yet arrived. 28 In implementing this princi-
ple the SIPI court required the AEC to draft a written statement 
supporting its decision that an EIS was not yet required. 29 The court 
explained that this statement of reasons would serve two functions: 
It will ensure that the agency has given adequate consideration to the 
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problem and that it understood the statutory standard. In addition, it 
will provide a focal point for judicial review of the agency's decision, 
giving the court the benefit of the agency's expertise.30 
By allowing the agency certain leeway in its initial decision and 
subjecting that decision to de novo review after the agency has 
documented its reasons for not filing an EIS, the SIPI court effec-
tively monitored this aspect of agency compliance with NEPA. 
Judicial review of the contents of agency impact statements has 
also been thorough. The contents of each impact statement must 
provide a complete analysis of the environmental consequences of 
the project and viable project alternatives.3! In accordance with the 
"strict standard of compliance" first imposed by Calvert Cliffs, the 
EIS must meet a standard of "full disclosure" of all matters relevant 
to informed environmental decision-making. This demanding stan-
dard is tempered only by a "rule of reason": 
In reviewing the sufficiency of an agency's compliance with § 102, we 
do not fathom the phrase 'to the fullest extent possible' to be an absolute 
term requiring perfection. If perfection were the standard, compliance 
would necessitate the accumulation of the sum total of scientific knowl-
edge of the environmental elements affected by a proposal. It is unrea-
sonable to impute to the Congress such an edict ... [However,] the 
phrase 'to the fullest extent possible' clearly imposes a standard of envi-
ronmental management requiring nothing less than comprehensive and 
objective treatment by the responsible agency ... Thus, an agency's 
consideration of environmental matters that is merely partial or per-
formed in a superficial manner does not satisfy the requisite standard.32 
The contents of the EIS provide the reviewing court with insight 
into the sufficiency of agency compliance with both NEPA's proce-
dural provisions and its substantive thrust. The First Circuit de-
scribed three perspectives from which a reviewing court must exam-
ine the contents of an EIS: 
First, it [the EIS] permits the court to ascertain whether the agency 
has made a good faith effort to take into account the values NEPA seeks 
to safeguard. To that end it must 'explicate fully its course of inquiry, 
its analysis and its reasoning'. . .Second, it serves as an environmental 
full disclosure law, providing information which Congress thought the 
public should have concerning the particular environmental costs in-
volved in a project. To that end, it 'must be written in language that is 
understandable to nontechnical minds and yet contain enough scientific 
reasoning to alert specialists to particular problems within the field of 
their expertise' .. .It cannot be composed of statements 'too vague, too 
general and too conclusory' ... Finally, and perhaps most substan-
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tively, the requirement of a detailed statement helps insure the integrity 
of the process of decision by precluding stubborn problems or serious 
criticism from being swept under the rug. A conclusory statement 'un-
supported by empirical or experimental data, scientific authorities, or 
explanatory information of any kind' not only fails to crystallize issues, 
... but 'affords no basis for a comparison of the problems involved with 
the proposed project and the difficulties involved in the alternatives' 
... Moreover, where comments from responsible experts or sister agen-
cies disclose new or conflicting data or opinions that cause concern that 
the agency may not have fully evaluated the project and its alternatives, 
these comments may not simply be ignored. There must be good faith, 
reasoned analysis in response. [emphasis added and citations omit-
ted)33 
Consequently, a final and perhaps distinct procedural require-
ment that agencies exercise "good faith" in the preparation and 
utilization of the EIS has emerged. Calvert Cliffs explained this 
duty as follows: 
NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment on the part of 
federal agencies. In each individual case, the particular economic and 
technical benefits of planned action must be assessed and then weighed 
against the environmental costs; alternatives must be considered which 
would affect the balance of values ... The magnitude of possible bene-
fits and possible costs may lie anywhere on a broad spectrum. Much will 
depend on the particular magnitudes involved in particular cases. In 
some cases, the benefits will be great enough to justify a certain quan-
tum of environmental costs; in other cases, they will not be so great and 
the proposed action may have to be abandoned or significantly altered 
so as to bring the benefits and costs into a proper balance. The point of 
the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that, with possible 
alterations, the optimally beneficial action is finally taken. [emphasis 
addedJ34 
The court noted that "the basic purpose of the Act" necessitates 
judicial review of agency preparation and utilization of the EIS to 
insure that "individualized consideration and balancing of environ-
mental factors - conducted fully and in good faith" has taken place 
in each instance.35 Calvert Cliffs left no doubt that where federal 
agencies have not met this standard courts will reverse and remand 
for further agency efforts. 38 
Good faith duties thus are required of an agency at two levels in 
order to comply with Section 102(2)(C).37 Agencies must prepare the 
EIS in good faith 'so that its contents are sufficiently complete and 
contain the exhaustive analysis demanded by NEPA. And at the 
final decision stage, when the agency balances environmental costs 
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against the projected social and economic benefits of the project, 
that balancing also must be accomplished objectively and in good 
faith. 
The demands of good faith enable the judiciary to evaluate 
agency thought processes far more effectively, and on a more subjec-
tive basis, than mere review of the adequacy of documents produced 
by agencies. Agency bad faith has not been defined nor is it clearly 
definable. The judiciary therefore has great flexibility under this 
standard to ensure that the spirit and substantive goals of NEPA 
are carried out. It seems doubtful that an agency can ever be said 
to have met NEPA's demands of good faith when that agency con-
tinues to advance an environmentally harmful course of action in 
the absence of a compelling social, economic or political justifica-
tion. 38 It is hardly surprising that an agency may fall short of good 
faith when its own self-interest hangs in the balance. Such agency 
transgressions nonetheless supply reviewing courts with opportuni-
ties for enjoining agency action on "procedural" grounds. 
It appears, therefore, that courts utilize a wide scope of review 
under Section 102(2)(C). There are significant opportunities for ju-
dicial interference to ensure strict compliance with NEPA's objec-
tive procedures. Furthermore, the procedural requirement that 
agencies conduct a good faith consideration and balancing of envi-
ronmental factors affords a judicial basis for ensuring agency com-
pliance with the substantive goals of NEPA. Curiously, however, 
when compliance with NEPA's substantive duties is expressly at 
'issue courts have exercised less probing review. 
n. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER 
NEPA 
Substantively, NEPA directs federal agencies to choose the least 
environmentally harmful course of action "consistent with other 
essential considerations of national policy."3D To satisfy NEPA's 
substantive requirements, agencies must make at least two correct 
choices on the basis of the EIS. First, agencies must choose the 
alternative course of action with the optimal environmental 
cost/benefit ratio, weighing potential environmental damage 
against expected project benefits. Second, agencies must decide 
whether this cost/benefit ratio warrants proceeding with the pro-
posal at all.40 Additionally, NEPA may create enforceable duties for 
agencies to minimize or avoid any environmental harm contingent 
upon the course of action ultimately chosen,41 
The leading case on judicial review under NEPA's substantive 
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rights, Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, United 
States Army, 42 adopted the standards of review suggested by Calvert 
Cliffs and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 43 Essentially, 
an agency decision may be reversed on its substantive merits if it is 
arbitrary and capricious or clearly gave insufficient weight to envi-
ronmental factors: 
The standard of review to be applied here and in other similar cases 
is set forth in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe . .. The review-
ing court must first determine whether the agency acted within the 
scope of its authority, and next whether the decision reached was arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law. In making the latter determination, the court must decide if 
the agency failed to consider all relevant factors in reaching its decision, 
or if the decision itself represented a clear error in judgment. 
Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court must first determine if 
the agency reached its decision after a full, good faith consideration and 
balancing of environmental factors. The court must then determine, 
according to the standards set forth in §§101(b) and 102(1) of the Act, 
whether 'the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was 
arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental val-
ues .. .' [citations omitted]44 
Following the lead of the Eighth Circuit, several courts have 
adopted substantive review under the same standard, which has 
become kriown as the "substantial inquiry" test.45 
The exact wording of the standard for substantive review remains 
unsettled, yet courts allowing such review agree that it is of limited 
scope. As in other areas of administrative law, the courts will refrain 
from substituting their own subjective judgments about the merits 
of a particular project for those of the agency involved.48 
Concededly, there is merit in this judicial formulation of the stan-
dard of substantive review. The trade-off of environmental costs 
against other social, economic and political benefits which are es-
sential to the fulfillment of national policy involves many imponder-
ables, and objective factors upon which to base judicial judgments 
are not readily ascertainable. However, the strength and compara-
tive weight of conflicting national policies may be gauged at least 
roughly from the tenor of Congressional enactments. On this basis, 
NEP A stands out as an eloquent and forceful Congressional state-
ment that environmental preservation and enhancement is abso-
lutely essential to the continued well-being of the nation. Therefore, 
should the occasion arise for judicial review of compliance" with 
NEPA's substantive rights under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
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dard, judicial review could be meaningful, even though restrained. 
The process of review should not end, however, once a court has 
decided that an agency has duly complied with the above standard. 
Because substantive review under NEPA is a relatively uncharted 
area, different standards of review may ultimately develop for dif-
ferent substantive rights. Particularly if NEPA is construed in the 
future to require minimization or avoidance of environmental harm 
in any agency action actually taken, courts may impose a more 
demanding standard of review. 47 Although determining reasonable 
requirements for minimization of environmental harm in each case 
can be difficult, it does not involve reconciliation of conflicting na-
tional policies, and stable principles for judicial decision can be 
developed. 
In summary, substantive review under NEPA has thus far pro-
vided only a restrained judicial evaluation of the merits of agency 
action in light of NEPA's policies. However, if an agency chooses a 
course of action which is offensive to NEPA's substantive goals, the 
chances are slight that it will have complied with all of NEPA's 
procedural requirements. Conversely, if an agency observes NEPA's 
procedural requirements in good faith and maintains a truly open 
mind during the process, it is likely that the course of action ulti-
mately chosen will be environmentally acceptable. Any other choice 
would probably be a violation of the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard. And, if an agency observes NEPA's objective procedural re-
quirements while continuing to nurture its preference for an envi-
ronmentally offensive course of action, it is likely that the agency 
would be found to have violated the procedural requirement that an 
EIS be prepared and considered in good faith. Analysis of the 
SCRAps case supports the accuracy of this thesis and brings out a 
significant interrelationship of procedural and substantive compli-
ance with NEPA. 
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ENvmONMENTALLY OBJECTIONABLE 
CONDUCT UNDER NEPA: SCRAP v. U.S. 
SCRAP is only the latest in a series of cases arising from railroad 
rate changes beginning in 1971.49 These cases involved efforts by an 
organization of law students known as Students Challenging Regu-
latory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) and various other environmen-
tal groups to force the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to 
comply with NEPA in connection with the application of across-the-
board freight rate increases to recyclable commodities. Under its 
statutory authority, the ICC had suspended the proposed rate in-
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creases while it investigated their lawfulness, but both the investi-
gation and final ICC decision regarding the rate hikes were com-
pleted without preparation or consideration of an impact state-
ment.50 
Under pressure and threat of suit, the ICC reopened its investiga-
tion for the limited purpose of satisfying NEP A. 51 At this late point 
in the decision-making process, the ICC prepared a draft EIS and 
circulated it to the designated federal agencies and private organi-
zations for comment. 52 The responses obtained were highly critical. 
The ICC, however, refused to hold new hearings on the environmen-
tal consequences of the proposed rate hikes and proceeded to issue 
its final EIS. The final EIS acknowledged the comments received 
at the draft stage, but the Commission's original analysis and con-
clusions remained unaltered. Because the ICC adhered to its posi-
tion that approval of a general rate increase did not warrant inquiry 
into the effect of the entire rate structure on the environment. The 
final EIS discussed only the marginal impacts of the proposed rate 
increases.53 The revised ICC opinion with regard to the rate increase 
did not respond to the issues raised by the EIS. It merely attached 
a one-sentence addendum to the original opinion which adopted the 
EIS in its entirety and discontinued the ICC investigation.54 In re-
sponse to an action brought by SCRAP and other plaintiff-
intervenors, a three judge court temporarily enjoined the ICC from 
permitting the railroads to collect the rate increases. 55 The Supreme 
Court vacated that injunction on the ground that the court did not 
have jurisdiction to enjoin the ICC in its general rate-making capac-
ity and remanded for further consideration.58 
The district court read the Supreme Court decision narrowly, 
noting that it did not entirely preclude review. The Supreme Court 
had merely prohibited injunctive relief against ICC rate-making, 
leaving the lower court free to formulate other forms of reliefY With 
this in mind, the SCRAP court examined ICC compliance with 
NEPA prior to considering the proper form of relief. 
The SCRAP court's first comment on the ICC's procedural com-
pliance with NEPA reflected disapproval of "the combative, defen-
sive and advocatory language and style" of the impact statement. 58 
The court found this fault to be "at least evidentiary of the fullness 
and the fairness of the agency's consideration" of environmental 
factors in its decision to allow rate increases. 59 Language and style 
alone would not be enough to invalidate the entire EIS for bad faith, 
the court said, yet this type of language and style were indicative 
of bad faith on the ICC's part.80 
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Three specific shortcomings of the ICC impact statement then 
received particular attention. First, the court examined the ICC's 
treatment of a substantive environmental issue - the responsive-
ness of the demand for secondary materials to changes in transpor-
tation costs.6! Instead of making a thorough quantitative economic 
study of this issue as had been suggested, the ICC's impact state-
ment merely disparaged the methodology of a privately commis-
sioned study which reached conclusions adverse to the agency posi-
tion. The Commission's argument was that the marginal rate in-
crease would not affect the use of secondary materials. This conclu-
sion was based on general discussion in the EIS of past trends in the 
use of such materials. 62 The ICC's impact statement failed, however, 
to note the fact that while demand for recyclable commodities had 
increased, demand for primary goods had also increased. Hence, the 
inference that the Commission wished to draw from these trends, 
namely, that increased rates would not hinder the demand for re-
cyclable materials, was unjustified. The court indicated that more 
detailed and substantial evidence was necessary to support any in-
ference that the demand for scrap iron and other recyclables would 
not have increased more if the freight rates had been held down.63 
The ICC's cavalier treatment of this issue not only left the contents 
of its EIS fatally deficient,64 but also indicated to the court the ICC's 
lack of good faith: 
It is difficult for us to understand how the statement can conclude 
that there is no significant environmental impact without a quantitative 
study of the responsiveness of the demand for each type of scrap to 
changes in recyclable transportation costS.65 
A second deficiency in the content of the ICC's EIS also drew the 
court's attention. The Commission failed to respond to a Depart-
ment of Transportation study which established that some second-
ary materials contributed more railroad revenue over costs than 
their competing virgin materials.66 The ICC did not rebut this study 
with an analysis of its own, nor did it attempt to justify the dispari-
ties uncovered by this study. If transportation expenses do affect the 
demand for recyclable materials, the court concluded that the EIS 
must set forth justification for existing disparitiesY Moreover, the 
ICC should have advanced its own "comprehensive alternative 
analysis" of the issues. The limited discussion offered by the ICC 
failed to "present a rigorous analysis of what justifies the specific 
disparities between primary and secondary rates."68 Third, the 
Commission neglected to modify its statement in response to com-
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ments suggesting that it consider the effect of rate increases on the 
long-term development ofthe recycling industry. More particularly, 
the EIS did not analyze whether a freeze of rates on recyclables 
would encourage further development of industrial processes utiliz-
ing secondary materials. This third transgression - the ICC's fail-
ure to respond to comments elicited on the draft statement - also 
constituted a fatal deficiency in the EIS.89 
The court caustically disposed of the ICC's declaration that an 
application for a rate increase was not the proper vehicle for examin-
ing the effect of the overall rate structure on the environment: 
[No] consideration of the environmental impact of approving the 
recyclable rate increases could be full without an analysis of how the 
underlying rate structure itself affects the environment. It is the under-
lying rate structure which the percentage increases aggravate; if this 
structure contributes to the degradation of our environment, then the 
increases would at least presumptively aggravate that contribution. 70 
The court suggested that any adverse environmental impact of the 
underlying rate structure later uncovered by the ICC's revised EIS 
could be remedied gradually by holding down the rates on recycla-
bles when other increases were granted.71 
The ICC's obligation to consider the cumulative effect of the rate 
structure could not be put off or shunted onto the ongoing Commis-
sion investigation into the freight rate structure.72 If the Commission 
wished to utilize this separate study for consideration of the broader 
rate structure issues, it could do so. However, a moratorium on rate 
increases for recyclables would be necessary until this separate in-
quiry had been completed and NEPA's requirements had been ful-
filled. 73 
The SCRAP court relied heavily on NEPA's procedural require-
ment of good faith in reaching its conclusions. On the question of 
ICC good faith, the court considered whether environmental factors 
had been discussed in sufficient depth in the EIS and whether the 
interplay between costs and benefits in the EIS indicated an "indi-
vidualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors."74 
Thus, even if environmental factors are given in-depth considera-
tion, an EIS may be deficient if it fails to weigh, specifically and in' 
a reasonable manner, environmental factors against the economic 
and other asserted benefits of the project. 
In holding for the plaintiffs, the court relied solely on the ICC's 
lack of compliance with NEPA's procedures. However, there were 
strong suggestions that the court disapproved of the ICC action on 
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substantive grounds as well. NEPA specifically states that federal 
agencies have a responsibility "to use all practicable means," con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to 
" ... approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable re-
sources. "75 In light of this substantive goal,78 the tone of disapproval 
which permeates the SCRAP opinion is more readily understood. 
The ICC's failure to grant special rates (or at least special considera-
tion for the rates) for recyclable materials seemed inexcusable. The 
SCRAP court hinted that it would probably have to reverse the ICC 
decision unless the Commission changed its position after revising 
its EIS to comply with NEPA: 
We do indeed entertain 'substantial doubt' about the consistency of 
the Commission's allowance of the rate increases with the congressional 
mandate that the Federal Government 'use all practicable means' to 
'approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources' 42 
U.S.C. §4331(b)(6). We indeed might well question whether the Com-
mission can allow the recyclable rate increases without clearly giving 
'insufficient weight to environmental values.' See Calvert Cliffs . .. 77 
This statement transmits a clear warning to the Commission. In 
essence, the court suggests that unless the ICC changes its substan-
tive position as well as improving its procedural compliance, it will 
be found in violation of NEPA. The opinion's invocation of the 
second recognized standard for substantive review under NEPA, 
that of clearly insufficient weight to environmental values, indicates 
the seriousness of the Commission's deficiency and the court's likely 
response to that deficiency should it persist. 
The court apparently proceeded on the theory that if it forced the 
ICC to follow NEPA's procedures in good faith the Commission 
would make the proper choice. The court hoped that "improving the 
decisionmaking process will improve the decision."78 Rather than 
evaluating the substantive merits of the ICC action at that time, the 
court remanded and gave the ICC another chance to comply with 
NEPA's substantive requirements and strict procedural directives. 
SCRAP is significant for two reasons. First, by ordering the ICC 
to analyze the environmental consequences' of the underlying rate 
structure, the court reached the broader, more significant environ-
mental issue implicit in the marginal rate increase. Rate increases 
are an almost automatic agency function, easily justified by infla-
tion or other changes in the tranportation industry. The underlying 
rate structure, on the other hand, represents the product of con-
scious decisions concerning the percentage of total railroad revenues 
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after costs which should be contributed by shippers of various com-
modities. Meaningful environmental decision-making can only be 
conducted by taking these broader issues into consideration. Al-
though the basic rate structure decisions were made long before 
NEPA's passage, any post-NEPA action premised on such decisions 
requires that they be re-evaluated through NEPA's procedures in 
light of NEPA's substantive goals.79 
Secondly, SCRAP is significant because it illustrates use of the 
liberal standard of procedural review under NEP A as a means of 
achieving NEPA's substantiye ends. The Department of Transpor-
tation study indicated that certain primary goods benefit from more 
advantageous rates than the recyclable commodities with which 
they compete.so Whatever the original justification for these dis-
criminatory rates, the court intimated that they could no longer 
endure in light of NEPA's clear mandate. However, the SCRAP 
court reviewed the Commission's actions solely on a procedural 
level, finding that the ICC failed to make a good faith objective 
balancing of environmental and other factors.81 Such skillful use of 
NEPA's procedural review mechanisms to compel thoroughreconsi-
deration of the basic premises of agency action and the substantive 
soundness of environmental decisions is a creative step, reaching 
beyond those taken in the bulk of NEPA cases. SCRAP sets an 
example to be emulated by other courts. 
CONCLUSION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL REVIEW UNDER NEPA 
Procedural review under NEPA is much more firmly established 
than its substantive counterpart.82 It is made even more attractive 
because the standards for reviewing agency procedural compliance 
with NEPA give the reviewing court significantly more latitude 
than do standards for substantive review. Cases decided on proce-
dural grounds therefore have a better chance of being upheld on 
appeal. Faced with equally justifiable choices between substantive 
and procedural review, it is no surprise that most courts opt for 
procedural review. Reversal on procedural grounds has the added 
advantage of allowing courts to retain jurisdiction over the matter 
to oversee agency reconsideration of its choice of action in view of 
environmental factors. By contrast, a trial court decision that the 
agency's substantive decision was in error would probably result in 
the court's permanently enjoining the agency project, ending it until 
the agency could come up with a new proposal. Overlaps between 
NEPA's procedural and substantive duties ensure that reviewing 
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courts will almost always have an option between procedural and 
substantive review.83 The SCRAP court chose the procedural review 
option to achieve the same sort of results that would have been 
attainable under substantive review. 
The following hypotheticals help illustrate the importance of the 
judicial option between procedural and substantive review. If an 
agency completely ignores an important environmental factor in its 
decision-making, courts can justifiably find a substantive violation 
of NEPA because "the actual balance of costs and benefits that was 
struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environ-
mental values."84 Such an agency transgression, however, would 
probably be rooted in an inadequate impact statement, one which 
failed to discuss the environmental factors at issue. Thus, under a 
procedural standard of review the court could find the contents of 
the EIS lacking and remand to the agency with instructions to re-
consider the substantive decision in light of the improved EIS. 
Even where the content of an EIS seems technically adequate, 
and the EIS discusses all the requisite topics in sufficient detail, the 
interplay of substantive and procedural duties is significant. An 
agency that intends to take action offensive to NEPA will try in the 
EIS to present its own position as favorably as possible. The agency 
may attempt to discredit opposing views and draw conclusions 
which are of questionable validity in view of the information which 
the EIS itself contains. In this situation a reviewing court will re-
mand for agency reconsideration in light of the good faith objective 
balancing consideration which NEPA's procedural duties require. 
The ICC took this approach and the SCRAP court found a violation 
of NEPA's procedural duty to conduct a "full good faith considera-
tion" and balancing of environmental factors.85 
Finally, an agency bent on an environmentally harmful course of 
action could conceivably prepare an EIS which contains adequate 
discussions of the requisite topics and draws valid conclusions from 
the data contained therein. The agency may be in compliance with 
NEPA if the environmental harm caused by the project is justified 
by other essential considerations of national policy.8ft Absent such 
justification, however, the court could find that an agency decision 
to proceed in spite of substantial environmental harm that is both 
documented in its EIS and given appropriate weight in the EIS 
cost/benefit analysis constitutes a violation of NEPA's substantive 
requirements. In these limited circumstances, the judiciary will 
apply the substantive standards which NEPA imposes. By first en-
forcing the procedural requirement that EIS contents be detailed 
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and achieve full disclosure of adverse environmental impacts, courts 
will prevent the agency from advancing a one-sided position.87 By 
then enforcing the procedural requirement that agencies articulate 
a good faith cost/benefit analysis which is reasonable in light of the 
data presented in the EIS, courts will force agencies to abandon any 
environmentally damaging alternatives. Thereafter should an 
agency decide on a course of action which is unjustifiably damaging 
to the environment, the courts would have an adequate foundation 
upon which to enjoin agency action under NEPA's substantive re-
quirements - the last line of defense under NEPA. 
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